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Introduction:

Some Obvious Points

The topic of foreign investment in Latin America is so fraught with
misunderstandings and emotional overtones that it seems wise to start with
some generalizations on which agreement is almost assured.
lowed by a look at some misconceptions in this field.

This will be fol

The paper will close

guessing at future trends.
Latin American policies toward direct foreign private investment (DFI)
arise, at a given point in time, mainly from the interplay of circumstances
in the world economy with a given Latin American country's needs at its
stage of development.

The historical experience of each country will also

weigh heavily on the host country's perception of benefits and costs of
foreign investment.
A key feature of the world economy of the 1960's was the existence of
several major centers of capital and modern technology, such as the U.S.,
Western Europe, Japan and Eastern Europe.

This situation opened the

way

for a gradual breakup of old commercial "spheres of influence", and the creation
of a competitive and multilateral world trading community.

Recent difficulties

in the world monetary system show that there are important adjustment problems
on the road to that free-trading, multilateral goal.

'

Furthermore, one may

fear that the very rapid expansion of large multinational corporations (MNC's)
could, in a few years, turn that relatively competitive world market into
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one dominated by a handful of oligopolies , controlling both finance and
trade.

One cannot dismiss a priori either the fear that the l970's will

witness a return toward protectioni st neo-mercan tilism nor the scenario
where an expanding world economy is managed from a few boardrooms located
1 But I still find more likely an extension
in New York, London and Tokyo.
1
into the 1970's of the (on the whole) healthy 1960 s competitive trends

in world commerce and finance.
For Latin American, of course, this would be very fine indeed.

The

major Latin American countries are entering fairly sophisticat ed stages
of industriali zation, not very far behind those of Italy~ Spain and
Eastern Europe, at which point selected foreign technology in specific
activities can be helpful.

The more potential suppliers of that tech

nology, the better.
Most Latin Jl.merican countries are also keenly aware of their need to
~xpand and develop new, or non-traditi onal, export lines, a task which
would be difficult or impossible in a stagnated world economy, and costly
in one dominated by few oligopsonis tic buyers.
But besides the need for advanced technology and new export outlets,
Latin .American countries have kept alive their old aspiration to consolidate
their political and cultural independenc e by greater control over their
economic life.

Most of these countries are getting ready to join the

Atlantic and world communities as full-fledge d members, without the need
of

11

special relationshi ps a with hegemonic powers.

course, is not without (at least short term) costs.

Such a transition, of
Concessiona l aid,

for example, may gradually become a thing of the past for the more advanced
Latin .American countries (although donor countries, regardless of Latin

-3.American decisions 9 may cut if off anyway!).

This more stand-offish,

business-like attitude is what one could expect as Latin .America approaches
the per capita income levels of Southern Europe within a multilateral world
economy.

Note also how the traditional dependence of Latin American exports

on the United States market has declined from an unusually high 49 percent
of the total in 1952, to 42 percent in 1958 and to

34

percent in 1968.

One could go further and put forth the hypothesis that when DFI ex
pressed as a percentage of host country's total assets, or in per (host
country) capita terms, reach 1.high ;: levels, sharp and violent political
reaction is veriJ likely to be generated,

Mexico in 1910, Cuba in 1959,

and Canada (and Puerto Rico?) in 1971 shared that characteristic.
Under these circumstances, I expect that most Latin .American countries
will increasin1:;ly ask, not whether DFI is intrinsically 1:goodiv or /ibad 11 ,
but rather which investments fit better into host country's needs and plans,
and under what conditions can one obtain those investments.

Few would

argue with the proposition that DFI can, under certain circumstances, benefit
both investors and host countries.

Today we see some socialist countries

of Eastern Europe expanding their agreements with foreign capitalistic firms,
while the popular front government of Chile has certainly not closed the
door to all DFI, as witnessed by its automobile policy.
But it is also true that DFI, under present Latin American conditions,
will not automatically yield results favorable to host country development.
It is not only that, as the Indians of both North and South America found
out~ and as put by Ragnar Nurkse:

11

Foreitsn business investment is not

always a happy form of encounter between different civilizations. 112
the words of another distinguished economist, it is also noted that:

In
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•••

since private international capital movements are motivated by expected

net private return, and since the relation of net private return to gross
social return is heavily influenced by truces and other governmental policies,
there is no a priori reason for placing much confidence in the principle
of freedom of private international capital movements as a guarantor of
economic efficiency in the international allocation of world investment
resources. n 3
In other words, if foreign investors can borrow from host country's
credit resources at interest rates which are often negative in real terms,
make profits sheltered behind effective rates of protection which reach
100% and above, benefit from holidays and exemptions from import duties on
their raw materials, and remit profits abroad at overvalued exchange
rates, there may be doubts as to the net benefits which the host country
receives from such an activity.
This ma~r or may not be typical of a given country at a given time.
But it warns us that in the area of DFI, whether one deals with its
economics or its politics, there is a great need for careful empirical
analysis and cool pragmatism.

Contrary to the usual stereotype, emotionalism

and false heroics on this issue are not limited to Latin Americans only.
Some U.S. Ivfisconceptions Regarding DFI in Latin America
Hith distressing frequency, U.s. publications ( even hardnosed business
publications) and commentators use a disturbing rhetoric when dealing
with the topic of U.S. investments in Latin America.

Latin .American leaders

who argue for some new restriction on DFI, are q_uickly labeled
or

11

17

anti-foreign

11

anti-American;;, without giving the reader an idea whether the regulation

makes sense or not, and whether the one-to-one association of a particular
business with the U .s. national interest is justified.

If these publications

-5used the same standards to report U.S. economic news, one can imagine their
editions after President IJixon 's August 15th, 1971 speech.
have ran headlines of the following sort:

They would

"Xenophobic Republican Boss

announces Pearl.Harbor in Reverse--Anti-European steps also Taken l i .
This may seem like an exaggeration.

Yet, this last May, The New York

Times, no less, ran a story announcing that the Argentine government was
reversing

11

i ts shrill policy of economic nationalism';, and had ousted

. Minister
.
xenophobic
o f Economy, Aldo Ferrer ... .,4
·

11

the

It so happens that Dr. Aldo

Ferrer has a long and distinguished inte~national career, particularly in
Inter-American institutions.

As a senior adviser to the Inter-American

Committee on the Alliance for Progress, incidentally, he wrote a paper on
the role of foreign investment in Latin American development jointly with
that other well···•knmm nxenophobe '', Dr. Roberto Campos of Brazil. 5
Parts of the statements by the Council of the A~ericas on the new
foreign investment code of the cou.7.tries participatin,'.s in the Andean Common
Market represent another example of overreaction and purple rhetoric.
also contain threats which are worse than offensive:

They

they are not credible.

As put by the Vice-President and general counsel of ELTRA Corporation of
Hew York in a recent article:
•.• a sense of detachment could have prevented the Council
of the Americas, representing major U.S. business interests
in Latin America, from coming forth with the hasty and
inaccurate statement that the 'fade-out joint venture'
formula is an 'unworkable and unrealistic proposal on the
basis that foreign investors do not invest to go out of
business'. There are any number of modalities of I doincs
business', and if U.S.businessmen cannot prove versatile,
surely those from Hestern Europe and Japan will!6
To this one could add that the symbolism of pictures showing Fiat
..

.

trucks being produced in Ford I s old asse:r.1bly plant in Chile should not escape
U.s. firms.

More tangible i2 tl1e fe,ct tr.cat ten European and Japanese auto

makers recently answered Chile I s call for bids to form partnerships;

-6in which the Chilean government would mm at least 51 percent of the
equity.
New forecasts or threats of a 1idrying-up 11 of willingness to invest
sound particularly hollow when one reads about new contracts of Occidental
Petroleum Corporation and other U.S. investors (not to mention non-U.S.
investors) with Peru, less than three years after the air was filled with
the same warnings motivated by the Peruvian-I .P. C. quarrel.

Perhaps private

settlement of that dispute has been reached~ but to the naked eye it looks
as if Peru has backed down less than the investing community.

Mexician

history, of course, provides other similar examples.
But perhaps the most spectacular rhetorical fireworks belong not to
the private but to the public sector.

Latin Americans who during 1969

read in the opening lines of the Rockefeller Report on the Americas that:
"We went to visit neighbors and found brothers", heard recently that high
U.S. officials, talking :pres11i--nably about those same neighbors, say that
We don't have any friends there anyway. 117

11

It is not entirely clear why the topic of DFI arouses such strong emotions,
not only in host countries, but also in investor countries.

It may arise

partly from confusing foreign investment with pure foreign aid, in spite of
the clear fact that DFI has to do with business, risk, and profit, not
charity.

Another possible reason for exasperation at measures which restrict

DFI inflows into Latin America is summarized in the question:
a developing area, which is capital-poor, reject it?n
however, admits many answers.

11

How can

The question,

First, as noticed earlier, the major con

tribution DFI can make to the present stage of Latin American development
(in most of the countries) is not really as a supplier of capital nor

-Tforeign exchange, but as a provider of specialized techniques and talents.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, host countries should desire something
more than an indiscriminate increase in the inflow of the packages of capital,
technology and skills associated with DFI.

They should try to control, in

particular, the allocation of such an inflow, as well as the conditions
under which it is contracted, so that the social return of the investment
to the host country will exceed its costs.

Of course, these calculations

are not always carefully done, but on principle we are back to the need
to analyze each project, and such things as its contribution to developing
local technology, better knowledge of marketing channels, effects on local
entrepreneursh ip, etc.

Thirdly, even when there is a positive net return

to the host country from a particular DFI project, that country may not
allow it for the sake o~ minimizing foreign presence in its economy, or in
some sector of it.

Surely, this is a trade-off every sovereign country

has a right to choose; in fact, not all members of the Hestern community
have the same degree of openness to DFI, and this is no impediment to
mutually

prnf'i t.1:1hlF>

trade and other financial links.

One also reads in the U.S. other arguments regarding DFI which dim
rather than increase understanding.

It is, for example, sometimes pointed

out that, after all, total earnings of U.S. investments in Latin America
have averaged only 12 percent of the bookvalue of that investment, a not
exploitative figure.

(The data for these calculations are obtained from

company balance sheets.)

This figure by itself, I am afraid, casts very

little light on DFI issues.

T-Je

all know about accounting conventions; in

particular, there is considerable worry in Latin .America about over-invoicing

-8of imports from headquar ters to subsidiar ies, especiall y in pharmace uticals,
royalty and patent payments, etc., as ways to decrease book profits in
host countries and increase them at headquar ters.

It has been noted in

several countries that some plants show year after year accountin g losses,
and yet headquar ters makes further investmen ts into them.

The problems

raised by intra-cor porate sales and pricins technique s are, of course, not
limited to Latin American- U.S. relations ; furthermo re, they do not always
work to the disadvant age of host countries , as it appears in the case of
oil.

8

But the point is that one should not debase discussio ns regarding

DFI using book profit rates carelessl y.
Another line of thought which I find mystifyin g is one which implies
that those wishing to control DFI are only or mainly "elite groups n, bent
on increasin g their own power and status, :i.f necessary at the expense of
the masses.

;\Jo doubt those types exist in Latin America ( and elsewhere ).

But even stretchin g the use of "elite groups" into the realm of tautologi es,
the argument will give a dangerous ly misleadin g impressio n of Latin American
feeling on this issue.

The Venezuela n and Chilean Congresse s, both democra

tically elected and encompass ing many ideologic al groups, have recently
passed with near imanimity laws which restrict foreign investmen t in oil
and copper, respectiv ely.
member of the
psychic needs.

11

One could say that everyone in Congress is a

elite", and acts mainly to work out his own impulses and
Does anyone really believe that?

II
If the "elite hypothesi s were correct, one would expect moves to broaden

political participa tion to improve the investmen t climate.

Such a move

seems to be occurring in Argentina this year, and here is how it has been
reported from Buenos Aires:

For United States investors here, who have an esti
mated one billion dollars at stake, the news of the lifting
of the ban on political activity last ihursday night has
raised some gloomy prospects.
There is hardly any banned-until-now political party that
does not favor a sharper nationalist course at the expense of
foreign interests.9
One may note a sharp contrast:

while the historical record of DFI

is very much alive in the Latin American mind, it tends to be ignored or
downplayed in the U.s.

It is an inevitable fact that in social history

the sins of the father will haunt even the innocent son, and a greater
historical perspective in the part of U.S. observers could be helpful for
taking a more detached view of day-to-day DFI crises.

U.S. publications

are not incapable of taking such a detached and long run view of DFI
frictions between investors and host countries; I just find them more per
ceptive and cool when dealing with, say, the relations between Koreans
and Southeast Asians and Japan, or between Algeria and France, than those
between Latin llmerica and the U.S.

In fact, they can sound downright enthu-

siastic about Algerian and Asian reactions to the French and Japanese.

10

If nothing else, the coexistence in time of many different ways "of
doing business n should give some perspective in facing Latin American
changes in the rules of the game for DFI.

From reading the U.S. press one

gets the clear impression that the investment climate for foreign corpora
tions is better in Rumania and Yugoslavia, and even in the USSR, than in
most Latin American countries.

At first, this sounds crazy.

On second

thought, it illustrates the simple point that in the field of DFI the direction
of change often gets more attention than the average level of treatment.
Rough guidlines with a gradual tendency to become softer seem to be preferred
to weak ones tending erratically to get tougher.

If this is so, in most of

-10-

Latin .America things will get worse for tradition al United States investors ,
before they get better for those willing to operate in the new climate.
Some Latin .American Misconcep tions Regarding DFI
The case for closer control over DFI is not helped by fallaciou s or
misleadin g arguments which one often hears from Latin .American sources, or
The prize for con

from those sympathe tic to Latin American aspiratio ns.
fusion in this area has to go to the

0

decapital ization;' or the lithey-tak e

out-more- than-they -put-in.; argument.
This argument compares the amounts of fresh DFI inflows for a given
period with outflows for profit remittanc es, dividends , etc., generated
It is pointed out

by the stock of DFI establish ed in the host country.

that the latter sums exceed the former for Latin ft.merica; the implicati on
is that DFI is bad for the region, draining it of its surplus, and, therefore ,
-'

the region would be better off without DFI.
Note that this line of thought compares fresh investmen ts with outflows
generated by old investmen ts, and says nothing regarding the allocatio n
and output (or surplus-e eneration ) of those investmen ts.

Suppose, for

example, that in a given country accumulat ed DFI is $100 Million and it is
all located in the export sector producing every year $30 Million of exports •
Suppose further that during the last fifteen years no new DFI-has-c ome _in,
but. profit remittanc es have amounted to :µ10 Million per year.
then be argued that the host country will have been

11

It will

decapital ized" by

$150 Hillion during that period, and that profit remittanc es have exceeded
the original investmen t.

This is "bad".

-11Compare the previous situation with another, where for fifteen years
new DFI has come in at a rate of ~~10 Million every year, and that no profit
J
remittances have taken place yet.

Presumably this is "good.:, even though

the investments may all go to produce Coca-Cola and Corn Flaltes, at domestic

prices twice as high as those in the world market.
The point is that the often-given comparison of fresh DFI with profit
outflows is useless to judge whether or not a given country is benefitting
from DFI.

If the rate of new DFI inflows is constant, and the rate of

profit annually remitted abroad is positive, sooner or later outflows will
exceed inflows.

And if the period is made long enough, the sum of annual

profits or interest on a given investment will always exceed the original

sum put in, whether one talks about DFI or

a

personal savings account.

This will happen in DFI which may be, for other reasons, good, bad or

indifferent for host countries.
If the host country's economy is diagnosed to be limited primarily

by an acute foreign exchange constraint, the direct and indirect balance
of payments effects of DFI, and not only inflow minus profit outflow, should
be brought in, including its impact on exports and net import-substitu tion,
~

measured at world market prices.

But more generally, other economic

effects will have to be taken into account, in a full benefit-cost analysis,
in trying to assess how DFI will change the host economy.

That a given

proJect saves or generates foreign exchange, or does not, should not necessarily

be a decisive reason to accept or re,ject the proposal.

One should also

be on guard against the danger, noted by Benjamin I. Cohen, that fresh

DFI in export lines could create new enclaves of small net benefit to host
economies.
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Joint-ventures have many features appealing to host countries, when
compared with those of fully-owned subsidiaries of MHC I s.

But insistance

that all DFI must come in the form of joint ventures can have significant
costs, under present world market circumstances •11

Some MNC's simply will

not touch joint venture and may be more interested in investing in industria
lized countries ( including Eastern Europe) than in bargaining with LDC' s;
this may not matter much when there are several potential investors in the
field ( Gl-1/ autos) , or when the I-1.NC main asset is a brand-name of doubtful
social product (Kelloggs), but can delay entrance into specialized fields
(IBM/computers).

Other \'iNC's may be persuaded to give in to joint-ventures

especially when the host country has a large domestic market, but at the
price of letting them charge the mixed offspring higher sums for technology
:from headquarters.

Those MNC' s also generally show less zeal in promoting

exports from their joint-ventures than from their fully-owned subsidiaries.
Under the cover of good-will, they use more local and less foreign credit,
and their retained earnings are lower.

Their contribution to local entre-

preneurship can be more apparent than real if rigid rules encourage phonY;

or induce drawing on experienced>local partners.

Finally, some foreign

investors may quite eagerly seek joint ventures in the hope of obtaining
favorable treatment in tax and other matters which can be very onerous to
host economies.

In short, willingness to enter into joint ventures will

not necessarily separate

11

good\l from

11

bad 11 MHC's from the host country view

point, and very rigid rules in this area can involve important opportunity
costs, both because of vhat is kept out and of what comes in.
grant the difficulty in separating
rules of thumb a.

11

But let me

very rigid rules n from nrealistic

In the Latin lll11erican ambiance it is tempting to believe every story
putting the forei:.;n investor in a bad lic;ht, and to support every scheme
to reduce his profit.

Yet clearly there are 1)etter and uorse uays of doinr;

the latter) fron the viewpoint of host country's uelfare, as emphasized
by Paul P. Streeten; higher uages for privilegec. uorLers of , ·:1c' s are less

desirable in general than hie;her taxes vhich can :Jenefit via nublic
expenditures lar~er and less favored groups in the population.

Foreign

investors may beco:me exasperated at a nev charge acainst then:

that they

pay wages which are too higt!

Jut in fact the charc;e, uhich should be

extended to host cou.'1trJ labor policies, has some substance, especially
in countries ,rith a •Tidespread unemployment problem.

And, obviously, keeping

facts straight is a precondition for sensi"'ole decision--meldng .

(Before 1959

it was widely believed in Cuba that foreicn oil companies had actually
discovered vast amounts of oil in the islnnd, but t~wir ·;-;orld-,ride
strate1:;y led them to kee:J t 11ose discoveries secret, as reserves.

/ilas, the

story nou appears untrue) .
nnm.,,~t.i (' T,at,-in AmPri

~An ;·JP.eds and. Their Influence on Po].j.cies Toward DFI

nuch experimentation is r,oing on in Latin America regarding policies
toward DFI.

Brazil relies on public c0Jr1.mand of monetary, fiscal and foreign

exchange policies to control DFI, and uses :positive!, incentives and measures
to induce opening up of closed companies, foreign and national, to public
participation.

The Andean countries, on the other hand, have adopted a

code uhich calls for tighter regula.tions over DFI.

Some of the smaller

countries, devoid of much barr,aining pmrer, desperately try to induce
inflous by "wide-open" rolicies, takinc full-pase ads in The j:Jeu York Times

which produce embarrassment to other Latin A~ericans.

Cuba continues to

have nothing to do Fith any DFI, follouinr: a spartan (but not laconic)
style.
DFI.

There are, furthermore, numerous pro:9osals on ,:rhat to do about
Even in a given Latin American country, V1e social, political

and economic needs are many and often conflicting, pushing policy toward
DFI in different directions, and frequently in contrary ways for different
sectors within the same country.

Father tlrn.n survey this vast and hetero

geneous field, this section vill discuss briefl:." some sectoral and general
trends which seem in need of greater clarifice,tion.
The felt need to control basic sectors of the economy uill be enough
to maintain the pressure to nationalize, one ,-ray or another, major foreign

o~med activities in the field of traditional natural resources, especially
when such activities 9-,re of key importance to the host country.

As ex-

President Eduardo Frei has recently put it:
The degree of a\:areness and development reached by
these nations has led them to feel that it is against their
interests and their very identit~,r to allo1-: natural resources,
which are essential to them either as rau materials for their
industry or as prime export items in their economies, to remain
in foreign hands. Thus, the nationalization of these resources
will be unavoidable ... 12
Ever since the colonial :powers plundered the mineral and natural resource
wealth of Latin .America, startin,-::; in the 16th century, Latin Americans,
have felt that they were not getting a high enough share of the pure rents
generated by those God-given natura,l resources.

furthermore, and granting

that the prices at vhich those resources may be sold in ,rorld markets may
remain erratic, most countries do not wish to maintain a situation where
one more (to them) exogenous force, the foreir;n corporation, can introduce
decisions affectine, ti.1eir control of foreign exchan1::e receipts, regarded as
an elementary precondition to rational :,lanning.

Those feelings should not

-15be impossi ble to understa nd in the U.S. , vhere Alaska uants to own and
operate the oil pipeline which will dominate its economic life, where
Puerto Rico is pressing copper corpora tions for more favorabl e deals, and
I
,rhere Iiontana legislat ors complain that Anacond a s New York leadersh ip

treats that state like a colony.
So every shift in bargaini ng power can be expected to be used by
Latin .America n countrie s to push a little further to,rnrd local control.

Note

hov Venezue la, which 14 years ago was ·\ride open n to DFI, has skillfu lly
used Liddle East circumst ances to gain a e;reater share of its oil and
gas revenue s, as well as greater control over t;mt industry .

The history

of Chilean copper is another example , more complex , of this trend.
The product ion and mari(etin r; of certain natural resource s, such as

oil, copper and aluminUI;J., generate high gross profits which are the result
of two separate influenc es:

:-~ ure rents from rich naturs.l denosi ts, and
1

the oliga;,o listi c control of t:-1e industry .

As a first approxim ation,

one may vie," the sharing of pure rents as a conflict ive zero--sum game between
host countrie s and foreie;n corpora tions; both countrie s and corpora tions,
however , have a common interest in not allowinc ; too much competi tion in
the industry .

Because of this and other reasons , one can expect that

forei~n companie s will continue playing some role in this field.

For

example , althoush the Chilean copper situatio n is still unclear , Cerro
Corpora tion :may end up not only settling amicably with the Chilean governm ent,
but could also provide technic al help to the nationa lized copper mines of
that country .

But clearly, the days of the 99-year concessi ons are gone

in most (but not all!) of Latin A.merica .

If host countrie s feel confiden t that they can now run old export
lines, based on natural resource s, they are likely to uelcome some foreign
investm ent for the sake of expandin g new or non-tra ditional exports , particularly in manufac turing, but not excludin g agricul tural activiti es nor
11

new 11 natural resourc es, lil':.e timber or iron ore.

(1,n1at is a new natural

resource in one country may be an old one in another .)

Over the long run

Latin American countrie s, acting jointly if possible ,, would do well to
,

devote resource s toward developi ng their own marlc:eting channels and outlets ,
and picking up expertis e in the sale of non-tra ditional exports.

But

that process may take some time, and in the meanwhi le the ready-ma de faciliti es
of Ml'JC' s for world-w ide connecti ons loom appealin g.

It has already been

reported , for example , that IE:- was in 1969 the largest exporte r of manu
factured goods from both Argentin a and Brazil.

Even

here, however , the

bargaini nr; will typicall y be tougher than sixty or twenty years ago; if
nothing else, there are now more foreicn investor s who can be induced to
bid for export pro,ject s, as the Tionroe Doctrine carries over less and less
to economic matters .
There is a danger in too close a link-up between new Latin American
exports and DFI.

Investin g countrie s may be tempted to conditio n access

to their markets to favorabl e (discrim inatory) treatmen t to their investo rs
in exportin g host countrie s.
of hemisph eric preferen ces
preferen ce scheme.

This is one, among many reasons , why a system
would be far inferio r to a generali zed trade

(It is hard to visualiz e Japanes e-Latin American joint

ventures tapping much of the U.S. market under hemisph eric preferen ces.}
And I would add that it is also inf~rio r to just freezing trade restrict ions
at their pre-Au~ ust 15, 1971 levels.

Latin America has too much to gain,

-17both economically and politically, from a non-discriminatory world trading
community, to toss away multilateralism for the sake of some short term
advantage,
It is known that the process of import substitution has been rather
disorderly in most Latin ftJnerican countries.

In some sectors, duplication

of plant facilities behind excessive protection lead to unused capacity,
inefficiency and high costs.

Often, as in automobiles and other durable

consumer goods, foreign investors are conspicuously present and have not
always re.frained from clamoring for :9rotection.

There is a great need

for rationalization in this area, and in ma.riy cases it is likely to come

via direct government action, rather than more slowly workinG market forces.
Argentina, Chile and Peru have recently taken steps to rationalize their
auto industry •
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This could lead to frictions, but it must be borne in

mind that some kind of rationalization in high cost, excessive capacity
import substituting activities is quite desirable from the viewpoint of
economic efficiency.

There is indeed the n~ed to re-think in Latin America the whole traditional
policy of protectionism.

It is not only that it has yielded excessive pro

tection; it has also lacked a clear set of objectives.

Protectionism

typically leads, at least in the short run, to inefficiency in the use of

resources, as well as to income red:istribution in favor of the protected
entrepreneurs, at the expense of the rest of society.

It is possible that

,,.infant entrepreneurs 11 will eventually justify those subsidies by their
"learnine; by doing".

on industries.

Eotice that I put the emphasis on entrepreneurs, not

If this is accepted, I see little to justify Latin American

countries subsidizinf; foreign entrepreneurs in protected industries, as

-18those foreign entrepre neurs are hardly 'iinfants ,: , and, by definiti on,
are in activiti es which cannot pay their mm way without protecti on.
Protecte d industr ies, if they are going to be encourag ed at all, should then
as a rule be reserved to nationa l entrepre neurs to be, so to speak, their
training ground, and in that way justify their social cost.

The same

would apply to special subsidie s to protecte d industri es via credit, tax
rebates , etc.

Ideally , effectiv e tariffs , or the tariff-e quivale nce of other

measure s, should be gradual ly lowered even to infant-e ntrepren eurs, but
while they remain, say above 20 pre cent for a given activity , that activity
should be reserved to nationa l entrepre neurs, unless very special circum
14
Furtherm ore, nationa l
stances or nationa l objectiv es dictate otherwis e .
entrepre neurs who in the past have benefitt ed from protecti on would not be
allowed to sell out to foreign investo rs, unless they return to the nationa l
Treasury the accumul ated differen ce between the effectiv e protecti on they
received and the 20 percent limit.

But I suspect that the unpopu larity of

this proposa l among foreign investor s will be easily exceeded by the
enthusia sm with which it will be rejected by Latin .American protect ionists.
Another illustra tion of the need for closer coordin ation between
DFI and protect ionist policies is 13iven by bans of
to their domestic product ion by foreicn firms.

11

luxury" imports leading

A rational e may be given

for banning soft drink imports while allowing the establis hment of a Coca
Cola plant within the country , but such rational e is likely to be weak.
{Even when they do not receive protecti on, one may doubt the usefulne ss to
the host country of DFI whose major strength is a world-fa mous brand name
for manufac tured consume r goods created by persiste nt advertis ing.)

-19A rationaliza tion of protectioni st policy would also help to check
another negative influence exerted by foreign business on Latin American
economies, this time not through DFI but through meretriciou s peddling
of capital goods.

1,1ore than one Latin American white elephant has been

conceived in unholy marriage between heavily protected local entrepreneu rs,
often managers of public enterprises , and unscrupulou s foreign, very
frequently European, suppliers of machinery and equipment.
The previous paragraphs should be enough to dispell the notion that
because more and more of DFI is going to promote Latin American industria
lization, in contrast with old-fashion ed DFI in export-orie nted natural
resource exploitatio n, the need to control DFI has lessened.

From a purely

11
economic viewpoint, in fact, it may well be that the nold-fashion ed DFI

provided greater benefits to host econo~ies.
Latin American ability to generate domestic savings has outstripped
its capacity to produce indigenous technologic al advances, and even to
apply knowledge available from the rest of the worla..

But it is strongly

felt that this is no reason to neglect a close scrutiny of royalty and
patent agreements, not all of which are deemed to bring in desired
knowledge at least cost.

Government revision of royalty agreements between

Colombian and foreign firms is sa~d to have successfull y reduced outward
payments without sacrificing the technologic al inflow over the last few
years.

The Colombian regulations on licensing technologic al transfers

markedly influenced the relevant parts of the Andean foreign investment
code.

Now Argentina has also introduced comprehensi ve regulations in this

field, adding the interesting twist of requirinG fees for technologic al
transfers to be based, not on sales, but on the profits of Argentine firms.

-20e host
These measu res can partly be interp reted as attemp ts to improv
ts are thin
countr y bargai ning power in areas where intern ationa l marke
part of
and imper fect, and where the lmowle dge of those marke ts in the
indivi dual Latin Americ an firms is weak.

Just the fact that the new

for sale
regula tions state that all paten ts, tradem arks and agreem ents
govern ment,
of techno logy will have to be regist ered and approv ed by the
n suppl iers.
improv e the negot iating positi on of local firma vis-a- vis foreig
y's commi ttee
I am told that many a Colom bian firm has hinted to that countr
ed by
on ro.1al ties their willin gness to have propos ed agreem ents reject
foreig n
the govern ment, for the sake of a second bargai ning round with
suppl iers.

Such commi ttees also keep tabs on the costs to host count ries

can reject
of techno logica l transf ers from parent s to subsid iaries , and
to expor t, or
agreem ents which restri ct the freedom of host countr y firms
to buy foreig n goods from the cheape st source .

In other words , they also

act in rest,ra int
serve as a mild form of anti-t rust, comba tting clause s which
of free trade,

Note ~hat these measu res go beyond trying to deal with

handle far from
diQ+.n-r+.irm~ within the host countr y; they are meant to
compe titive world marke ts.
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se
.Anoth er obviou s way in which Latin Americ an countr ies can increa
with foreig n
their bargai ning power is by acting jointl y in negot iation s
elves.
invest ors, so as to avoid self-d efeati ng compe tition among thems
when the
Remember the histor y of corpor ate regula tion within the U.S.,
Massa chuset ts law was underc ut by compe tition from ·•1oose

II

New Jersey

states of
and Delaw are, or note the pointl ess recent compe tition among
withou t much
the U.S. in their tax laws, which has eroded their tax-ba se
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net effect on total investment.

16

These considerations provide the rationale

behind the desire of countries forming the .Andean Common Market to have
common foreign investment guidelines.

Just as such a market, in its early

stages, calls for a common minimum external tariff, it makes sense for it
to have some kind of a common minimum code for DFI.
Behind the trends reviewed in this section, one can detect not only
"growing nationalism 11 , but alsc growing sophistication in the part of Latin
.American policy makers, even though the new regulations can sometimes
substitute new irrationalities for old ones.

Of all the

11

gaps•i separating the

developing from the developed, one of the widest has been the gap in
knowledge and bargaining

0

know-how 11 when a host country sat to negotiate

with a foreign investor (witness the neeotiations between post-Sukarno
Indonesia and foreign investors).

For Latin America this gap is narrowing

and hopefully one will soon see in each country scores of officials trained
in both foreign business schools and. even in MNC' s, who then put their
experiences to work for their countries by negotiating new contracts
with foreign investors.

There is much Latin America can learn from a close

study of the modus operandi of the r.mc 's, even where the development
model being followed is one hostile to the philosophy of MNC's.
All of this implies that in the future no empty references to the
"sanctity of contracts" should impede a flexible approach to recontracting
and renegotiations, as new circumstances emerge in host countries and in
the world economy.

The concept of renegotiating contracts is hardly novel

for the industrialized countries; note, for example, frequent Pentagon
renegotiations with its contractors;

Note also how scores of labor contracts
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as well as internati onal commitments had to be put aside by the Presiden tial
announcement of August 15, 1971.

But this takes us into the subject matter

of the next section.
U.S. and Internati onal Reactions to Latin .American Policies toward DFI:
Minimizing Friction
Latin .American policies toward DFI, old and new, are very likely to
remain the major source of friction betveen the U.S. and Latin .America
for the foreseeab le future.

There is no issue where differenc es in the

inellect ual and emotional climate, North and South, are more marked.
With other foreign investors , such as Europeans and Japanese, with fewer
investmen ts, less historica l deadweight and more modest hemisphe ric political
roles, the climate is better, although not exempt of tension.

(My

colleague Benjamin Cohen tells me that South Koreans view U.S. investors
very much in the same light as Latin .Americans view the Japanese. )
While friction is, in the nature of things, inevitabl e, it need not
lead to apocalypt ic results.

Let me first look at some recent events in

this field 9 and conclude with some re.flectio ns on a few ideas which may
avoid over the long run a rerun, on a more massive scale, of the Cuban
U.S. hysterics of 1959-61.
A first thing to note is that U.S. policies in this area during 1969 and
1970 were quite reasonabl e, under the circumsta nces.

One can cite the non

applicati on of the Hickenloo per ammendment in the IPC-Peruv ian dispute
and, going outside the region, the quiet diplomati c settlemen t of
disputes between U.s. investors and Algeria.

The "low profile" had a good

chance of becoming a successfu l U.S. Latin .American policy, in spite of
misguided criticism of it as

11

do-nothin g".

Better steady "do-nothi ng"

-23than the previou s unstable mixture of warm rhetoric , some tied aid, and
an occasio nal invasion .
Unfortu nately, during 1971 and the

to an ugly, tough one.
{l)

11

low profile" appears to be changing

The symptoms have been:

Threats to use interna tional and bilater al concess ional aid

as a weapon in disputes between U.s. busines s firms and Latin .American
governm ents.

This goes beyond even the Hickenlo oper amm.endment, which

at least gave some

11

grace periodn for settlem ent, and left multila teral

organiz ations out of those dispute s.
(2)

Denial of access to near-com mercial credit, such as that

provide d by EXIMB.AHK, to countrie s which were in the process of negotia ting
settleme nt with foreign investo rs.

While that type of credit is not an

inevitab le component of interna tional transact ions in goods like commerc ial
airplane s, it is sufficie ntly common to make the denial or postpone ment of
a routine request come close to economi c boycott .
(3)

After much talk of trade preferen ces, in fact granted earlier

17 and in spite of substan tial and steady
this yea;r by Europe and Japan,
18
new Latin American export drives
U.S. trade surplus with Latin .America ,
were dealt a blow, whose negative psychol ogical impact is perhaps more
importa nt than its real inciden ce, by the 10% import surcharg e annotmc ed
by Preside nt Nixon this August 15.

It would indeed be ironic if after years

of preachin g the need for export-p romotio n in Latin .America by many people,
includin g interna tional and U.S. aid agencie s, and just when the message
is getting through , the major industr ialized countrie s turn protect ionist.
Is the fate of Latin America to be always out of step, turning away from
the world market when it is booming , as during the post war, and toward it

-24just when it turns protectionist?

At any rate, Latin American export

pessimists received much ammunition by the August 15th anneuncement.
These are very disturbing symptoms, one could almost say provocations,
which could unleash an unfortunate cycle of reprisals and counter-repris als,
leaving both sides politically and economically worse off at the end, and
destroying institutions and rules of the game within which mutual adjustments
can occur.
Over the last few years, several proposals have been put forth to
19 A
smooth the tensions which exist between MNC's and host countries .
few ideas arising from those proposals, and some new ones, may be mentioned.
One hears how truly "multinational" U.S. corporations with foreign
investments are becoming, and how this trend represents a great advance over
narrow nationalisms.

But if at every sign of friction with a host government

those companies run to enlist the power of the U.S. government on their
side of the fight, their claim to
good reason, as hollow.

11

multinationalit y 11 will be regarded, with

Private foreign investors cannot have it both
In a way, this point reflects the very old mistrust

ways ( for very long) •

of conservative economics for mixing up in shady proportions government
to international as well as
with private enterprise, which should apply
,,.
national busin~sses.

It suggests that government inte?W"ention in this

area, via institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), either do too little or too much.

If the U.S. government deems

that certain foreign investments do clearly involve the U.S. national
interest, then the U.S. government should become an open and declared
partner in the venture, and should take clear responsibility for every
aspect of the contract.

This is what the French government does, as I

-25understand it, with French investment in oil.

During the oil crisis of

1970-71, private oil 1-TI'.'lC's took on a quasi-publi c role, and the U.S. lifted
anti-trust regulations so they could present a common front.

Similar

consideratio ns could apply where DFI provides industrializ ed countries
with access to raw materials deemed strategic, for which open and com
petitive markets may be impossible even to imagine.

But for those foreign

investments which do not involve the U.S. national interest unambiguous ly,
then the U.S. government should leave risk taking as well as profits fully
to the private entrepreneu r.
Even under such narm's length 11 relationship between government and the
foreign investor, it is not unreasonabl e to expect that the U.S. government
will not remain totally indifferent if the existing business of one of
its citizens is systematica lly abused and plundered abroad.

India, after

all, shows concern over the treatment received by second- and third-gener ation
Hindus in Africa, and Chile watches over her emigrants in neighboring
Patagonia.

But it is dangerous to use receptivity to fresh DFI as criteria

to discriminat e among countries in matters relating to trade and aid.

There

is nothing in the post war multilatera l rules of the game, as embodied in
organizatio ns such as the GATT, and IBRD and the IMF, which encourages
a close link between trade and investment preferences .

Even within the

common market made up of the 52 United States, while there is free trade
in goods and free movement of labor, there remains a considerabl e amount
of state legislation which limit the operations of banks and other
financial institution s.

Similarly, the world community should be able

to create an environment in which each sovereign country can trade inter
nationally as much as it wants and can, while reserving its right to follow

-26more restrictive policies regarding the capital account of its balance
of payments.

Furthermore, it does not make much sense for foreign investors

to become all worked up about new restrictions over DFI which a Latin .American
country may impose, when it is known that similar practices are tolerated
by foreign investors in countries like Yugoslavia, Rumania, Japan and Sweden.
The 1971 international monetary crisis has dramatized the fact that
not even the Atlantic community is yet ready to become an noptimum currency
area 11 , within which capital flows would be as smooth as those between London
and Manchester.

Greater future reliance on more flexible exchange rates

and/or tighter controls over the capital account of the Balance of Payments
is likely among many industrialized countries.

In this setting, it is

particularly anachronistic to press LDC's for relaxation of their regulations
over certain types of capital flows.

A key characteristic of DFI is that it puts together into an indivisible
package capital, technology, management skills, information about foreign
markets, etc.

Economists know about the inefficiencies created by "tied

sales 11 , and anyone who believes in the benefits of free competitive markets
should be able to support efforts to give LDC's more options, by creating,
probably at low real costs, alternative and separate markets for each of
these elements.
In the first place, international private capital markets for LDC bonds
should be expanded and strengthened, facilitating access to them by those
countries wishing to rely less on concessional aid and DFI.

The expansion of

international capital markets during the 1960 1 s, and the degree of economic
maturity reached by many Latin .American countries make this option a promising
one for the 1970 's.

If Hungary can tap the Eurobond market, at least the

-27seven largest Latin .American countries should be able to do the same in
growing amounts.
International organizations such as the IBRD, the IADB, and the IFC
have done remarkably little in the field of technological transfer.

They

could step up their efforts to act as clearing houses of information
regarding where LDC's could obtain technological inputs in the cheapest
way, and not necessarily tied to capital transfers.

The socialist countries

could be brought in to participate more actively in those licensing markets.
International and regional organizations could also be more involved
in backstopping for LDC's in their search for information when those
countries are in the process of negotiating with foreign investors.

Unfortu

nately, the practices of some of those organizations have in fact been perverse
in the past; using the excuse that international private capital was available,
they have refused to lend for host country investments in certain sectors,
such as oil.

They have thus abstained from helping to diversify not only

the sources of capital, but more critically, the channels through which
Latin America has access to modern technology and information about the
state of particular world markets.
Professor Charles P. Kindleberger has called for a sort of GATT to
regulate MNC 's, as well as to serve as an international Ombudsman, charged
with preserving competition, avoiding inconsistent national regulations of
MNC's and for resolution of conflicts.

If sponsored by the United Nations,

such an institution could be most useful in avoiding many of the difficulties
we have reviewed.

The idea, incidentally, is far superior to similar ones

which have been proposed, but which restrict participation to Western
Hemisphere nations.

It is also superior to proposals for a multilateral

-28investment guarantee scheme operated collectively by all OECD members.
Such a scheme comes close to providing a framework for an investors' cartel.
Indeed, this is exactly the reason why recently The Economist of London
advocated that plan.

20

The ideas reviewed in these last paragraphs are meant for the long run,
and SB¥ little about thorny transitional disputes between Latin .American
countries, foreign investors and the U.S.

When viewed in the midst of

battle, those disputes can be exasperating and dismaying, although exhilarating
for those in search of confrontations.

v·lhen gloomily contemplating such

panorama, it is comforting to review the record of French-Algerian relations.
After a bloody war, many frictions an~ manoeuvres, including going to the
brink earlier this year as well as trying to bring other parties into their
di sput e,

21

arrangement.

they seem to have worked out a civilized and mutually profitable
Surely the U.S. and Latin America

can do even better.

Indeed,

the end of total U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere could open the way for
a genuine improvement in U.S.-Latin American relations.
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